Introduction
On September 1996, Staples and O±ce Depot, the two largest o±ce supplies superstores (OSS) in the U.S., announced their agreement to merge. The Federal Trade Commission voted 4-1 to oppose the merger on the grounds that it would likely lead to substantially higher prices. In fact, an econometric study commissioned by the FTC showed that prices are higher in markets where only one¯rm operates than in markets with two-or three-way competition. Addressing the FTC's concerns, Staples / O±ce Depot o®ered to sell a series of stores to rival O±ce Max, but the FTC maintained its opposition to the merger. Although the FTC's action was challenged by the merging parties, the Courts eventually ruled in favor of the FTC. Judge Hogan, who decided the case, dismissed the defendants' argument that cost e±ciencies would be signi¯cant and passed on to consumers. Moreover, entry was considered irrelevant as the cost of setting up a new OSS chain \would be extremely high."
1 Surprisingly, little importance was given to the issue of the impact of the merger on O±ce Max's expansion rate, even though the parties seemed to agree that the cost of opening a new store is reasonably low and certain. The defendants did argue that O±ce Max's growth in 1997 demonstrates the ease of expansion by existing leaders. However, Staples and O±ce Depot failed to show how the rate of expansion relates to the event of the merger.
The 1992 U.S. Merger Guidelines accept that, \in markets where entry is . . . easy, . . . the merger raises no antitrust concern and ordinarily requires no further analysis" (point 3.0). However, entry conditions have been given little weight in actual merger policy: It is di±cult to identify potential entrants and the height of entry barriers, whereas other indicators | such as market shares and concentration indices | are more readily obtained.
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By contrast, cost e±ciencies are a frequent argument in favor of mergers; and asset sales, such as the one proposed by Staples/O±ce Depot are frequently o®ered or requested as a partial remedy for the adverse e®ects of the merger.
Notwithstanding the general di±culties in taking entry into account in merger analysis, there are cases where both the set of potential entrants and the costs of entry seem easy to determine. Consider again the OSS industry. Although the costs of creating a new¯rm would be very high, it would certainly be possible for the non-merging party (O±ce Max) to expand into markets dominated by the would-be Staples/Depot alliance.
In this paper, I analyze the impact of a merger between two multi-location (or multiproduct)¯rms, taking into account the possibility of entry by rival¯rms, that is, the possibility that rival¯rms will open new locations (or create new products) as a result of the merger. More importantly, I show that post-merger entry dramatically shifts the perspective on cost e±ciencies as a merger defense and asset sales as a remedy. The e±ciencies defense is that mergers imply a decrease in marginal cost, part of which is passed on to consumers in the form of lower prices. But a more e±cient merged¯rm also implies that entry is less likely, as potential entrants would be facing tougher price competition. The bene¯t consumers receive from cost e±ciencies is therefore lower than if entry conditions were exogenous.
A similar phenomenon occurs with respect to asset sales. Asset sales are frequently sought as a remedy for the increased market power resulting from a merger. I show that asset sales and post-merger entry are \substitutes." By selling stores to potential rivals, merging¯rms e®ectively buy them o®, that is, dissuade them from opening new stores.
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This is good for the merging¯rms but bad for consumers: the latter prefer an asymmetric duopoly with more stores (no asset sales and entry by the rival¯rm) to a symmetric duopoly with fewer stores (asset sales).
Previous literature has explicitly considered the equilibrium adjustment following a merger (Farrell and Shapiro, 1990) . However, entry is typically not taken into account in this research. An exception is given by Werden and Froeb (1998) , who nevertheless do not address the issues of cost e±ciencies and asset sales.
The paper is structured is follows. In the next section, I present the model and the main results. In Section 3, I calibrate the model with data from the Staples case. Section 4 concludes the paper.
Model and results
Consider an industry where three¯rms own a series of stores each and compete in a given set of markets. Initially, the industry is at a free-entry equilibrium, in the sense that no¯rm would wish to open an additional store in any of the markets. Suppose now that Firms 1 and 2 merge, turning the industry into a duopoly. What will the new free-entry equilibrium Echoing the concerns of several recent merger cases, my particular focus is on markets that initially comprise only Firm 1 and Firm 2 stores, so that, absent additional adjustments, the merger would lead to a local monopoly. Speci¯cally, I consider the case when the merginḡ rms own one store each in the initial free-entry equilibrium. What is the impact of the merger in such a market?
Absent any additional entry, we would go from a duopoly of one-store¯rms to a monopoly with two stores. The merger would naturally imply higher prices, to the detriment of consumers. However, less aggressive behavior by the newly-formed Firm 1&2 is likely to induce entry by Firm 3, which implies an increase in consumer welfare, both in terms of lower prices and greater product variety. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the importance of this e®ect on expected consumer welfare.
I assume each market is characterized by the Salop model of product di®erentiation. There exists a population of s consumers uniformly distributed along a circle of unit length. Firms have stores located along the circle. Each consumer is willing to pay up to v for one unit of the¯rms' product and chooses the¯rm o®ering the lowest total cost, where total cost is given by price plus transportation cost. The latter is equal to t = d 2 , where d is the distance between the consumer's and the¯rm's locations.
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If total cost is greater than valuation, then the consumer makes no purchase. Firms must incur a sunk cost of k per location and a constant marginal cost of production c.
I assume the value of v is such that, when there is competition, the entire market is covered. It can be shown that this amounts to
For a given set of parameter values, there typically exist multiple initial free-entry equilibria. I consider the equilibrium that would result from the following sequential entry game: at stage 1, Firm 1 decides whether to open a store and where to locate it. At stage 2, Firm 2 does the same; then Firm 3; then Firm 1 has the option of opening a second store; and so forth. In the case when only 
are such that this is the initial equilibrium and address the question of the impact of the merger between Firms 1 and 2.
Following the merger between Firms 1 and 2, there will typically exist multiple free-entry equilibria. I will assume that the new equilibrium results from entry by Firm 3 only. This assumption seems consistent with the observation that merging¯rms spend more resources restructuring than expanding. It also pins down a unique post-merger equilibrium.
The assumption that we start from a free-entry equilibrium with only Firms 1 and 2 implies particular parameter values, speci¯cally particular values of market size given k; c and v. Likewise, which new equilibrium takes place following the merger of Firms 1 and 2 depends on the values of k; c; v and s. Table 1 t the new free entry equilibrium? Given that Firm 1&2 will now price less aggressively, it is possible that Firm 3 want to enter when it didn't before.
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In order to answer this question, we compute Firm 3's equilibrium pro¯ts when it competes against a two-store Firm 1&2. This is done in the fourth row of Table 1 . Firm 3's equilibrium pro¯ts are given by ¼ From a consumer welfare point of view, it makes a big di®erence whether s is greater or less than s 2 . In cities of relatively smaller size, the e®ect of the merger is simply to increase prices; the number of stores and their locations remain the same. In cities of relatively larger size, however, the merger brings in new competition. Consumers then bene¯t from greater price competition as well as a greater number of stores (lower transportation costs). This is con¯rmed in Table 2 , which displays the average equilibrium price, transportation cost, and total cost (the negative of consumer welfare) in the three cases considered above: pre-merger, post-merger with no entry, and post merger with entry. Notice that , then a merger between Firm 1 and Firm 2 leads to entry by Firm 3; average price and average transportation costs decrease, and so consumer welfare increases.
Cost savings. To a greater or lesser extent, cost e±ciencies are commonly invoked as a merger defense. For example, in preparation for the Exxon-Mobil merger, it is reported that \the companies are working to show cost savings that will result from the merger" (The Wall Street Journal Europe, January 20, 1999 in Staples' defense of its proposed merger with O±ce Depot. The general argument is that, because of increased e±ciency, consumers bene¯t from a merger insofar as cost savings are passed on to buyers in the form of lower prices. This is particularly the case when savings are in terms of marginal cost. When entry is endogenous, however, we must also take into account the indirect e®ect of the merger. And this may reduce (or even reverse) the e®ect of cost e±ciencies on consumer welfare. What is the e®ect of cost e±ciencies on consumer welfare? From Table 2 , we see that, when the merger results in a monopoly, price is a function of v but not of c; that is, no cost savings are passed on to consumers. In case of duopoly, however, prices are a function of c and cost savings translate into lower prices and greater consumer welfare. Finally, cost savings by the merged Firm 1&2 have another important e®ect: Firm 3's equilibrium pro¯t in case it enters the market is lower. This implies that the threshold market size s 2 is greater the greater the cost e±ciencies. We thus have two opposing e®ects of cost e±ciencies on consumer welfare. On the one hand, equilibrium prices are lower (in case of duopoly); on the other hand, the probability of entry is lower: for some values of s, entry will not take place if there are cost e±ciencies whereas it would otherwise. That is, the greater cost e±ciencies may have a negative e®ect on expected consumer welfare, where \expected" means \over a distribution of values of s."
If the value of v is very high, then the di®erence in consumer welfare between postmerger monopoly and duopoly is also very high. The negative e®ect of cost e±ciencies then dominates the positive e®ect, to the point that expected post-merger consumer welfare is decreasing in the extent of the merger's cost e±ciencies:
Proposition 2 The greater the merger's cost savings, the lower the probability of postmerger entry. If v is high enough, then the greater the merger's cost savings the lower the expected post-merger consumer welfare.
Asset sales. Merger authorities often demand that would-be merging¯rms divest from some of their assets as a condition for approving the merger. Sometimes, the merging¯rms themselves take the initiative of including asset sales as part of their merger proposal. For example, Exxon and Mobil have a high combined market share in several Northeastern U.S. metropolitan areas (e.g., 24% of the stations in Northern New Jersey). It is reported that the companies \may be forced to sell or sever contracts for more than 1,000 gas stations . . . as a condition for U.S. approval of their $75 billion merger" (The Wall Street Journal Europe, January 20, 1999). Another example from the same industry is given by the merger between BP and Amoco, who \are expected to divest themselves of more than a hundred gasoline stations and sever ties with several hundred more in at least half a dozen U.S. states to gain U.S. Federal Trade Commission approval for their merger" (The Wall Street Journal Europe, December 30, 1998). Similar examples may be found in the European Union. In 1992, the European Commission allowed the takeover of Perrier by Nestl ¶ e once the latter committed to selling various of its well known brands, including Vichy, Thonon, Pierval and Saint Yorre (cf In order to address the issue of asset sales, I now augment the previous model by assuming that, together with the merger, the merging¯rms o®er to sell one of their stores to the nonmerging¯rm. I assume that Firm 1&2 make a take-it-or-leave-it o®er to Firm 3. After the merger takes place and asset sales are completed, Firm 3 decides, as before, whether it wants to open new stores, and competition takes place.
The purpose of asset sales, it would seem, is to create a more even distribution of assets between the merged¯rm and is rival, thus assuring a greater degree of competition and consumer welfare. Speci¯cally, suppose that in the initial equilibrium Firm 1 and Firm 2 own one store each. If the¯rms merge and there is no entry, then we have a monopoly with two stores; whereas, if Firm 1&2 sells one of its stores to Firm 3, then duopoly competition is maintained. Asset sales thus increase welfare. My main result is that the comparison is reversed once entry is taken into consideration Suppose that s 1 < s < s
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. Absent asset sales, no entry will take place following the merger between Firms 1 and 2. Selling one store to Firm 3 implies a duopoly with Firms 1&2 and 3, whereas no sale implies a monopolist Firm 1&2 with two stores. Clearly, total pro¯ts are greater in the latter case, so there are no gains from trade and accordingly no asset sale will take place. Suppose, however, that s . In particular, Firm 3 would not want to open an additional store: if, in the initial equilibrium, one of the incumbents did not want to open a second store, neither does Firm 3 now. Clearly, total pro¯ts are greater in the case of a duopoly with two stores only, so there are gains from trade and accordingly Firm 1&2 will sell one store to Firm 3. Finally, notice that consumer welfare is greater with three stores than with two. It thus follows that Proposition 3 Consumer welfare is lower when asset sales are allowed.
It is important to note that this result refers to voluntary asset sales. If the regulatory agency were to force Firm 1&2 to sell one store when s 1 < s < s 2 , then asset sales would increase consumer welfare.
Calibration
Following Proposition 1, the natural questions to ask are: how large is the price increase from a merger when no entry takes place? How large is the price decrease from a merger that induces entry? How likely is it that entry takes place following a merger? To answer these questions, I now proceed to calibrate the model based on data related to the proposed Staples / O±ce Depot merger. The Salop model presented above includes four parameters: v; t; c and k. Moreover, in order to address the issue of the likelihood of post-merger entry, we need to know the distribution of market size, f (s), and from this derive the relative probability that s The¯rst thing to notice when calibrating the model is that we can normalize units with no loss of generality. In fact, all of the values considered are proportional with respect to the money unit of account. Accordingly, I normalize units so that t = 1.
In its case against the merger, the FTC commissioned a study on the relation between concentration and prices. This study estimates that prices are about 10% higher in monopoly markets than in duopoly markets; 9 and about 4% higher in duopoly markets than in triopoly markets.
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We thus have two constraints on parameter values. Together with the normalization t = 1, this leaves us with one parameter, k, and the distribution of market size.
Regarding the distribution of market size, there are two possible strategies to follow. One is to take the \minimum information" approach and assume that, in the relevant range, the density of market size is constant. This is a very rough approximation, since it is well known that the density of demographic variables is typically decreasing. The advantage of this approach is that we do not need to calibrate k, as the relevant results are independent of its value.
The alternative strategy is to make the assumption that each city is a market and combine census data (city population) with company data (cities where stores are located). Second, I calibrated the value of k based on the constraint given by the frequency ratio between cities with one store and cities with two stores. From times 2578, the total number of cities/towns with population 10K+, times 5000, the frequency class size; µ = 1; s 0 = 10000). Rightmost frequency bar corresponds to 150K+. Source: U.S. Census Bureau and author's calculations. To summarize, I use three data-based constrains and one normalization to obtain the four model parameters. The resulting values are t = 1; c ¼ 3:62; v ¼ 4:57; k ¼ 8265. I now turn to the interpretation of these results.
Results.
The relevant results in terms of probability of entry and consumer welfare are presented in Table 3 . Row 1 gives the increase in total consumer cost (price plus transportation cost) in case there is a merger and no entry. taking entry into account, under the alternative assumptions of uniform and Pareto city size density. In both cases, the actual increase in consumer cost is substantially lower than in the case of no entry. In other words, entry does play an important role in the evaluation of the welfare impact of the merger. The importance of entry is con¯rmed by the values in Rows 4{7, which give the probability of entry as a result of the merger. Rows 4{5 give the probability that entry will take place in a given market. The estimates are about 42% under the uniform distribution assumption and about 16% under the Pareto assumption. These number, however, underestimate the actual impact of the merger since entry takes place in the markets of relatively larger size. A more appropriate measure is the probability that, for a randomly selected consumer, entry will take place in his or her market. These probabilities are presented in Rows 6{7: more than 50% under the uniform assumption and more than 25% under the Pareto assumption.
In order to get a better idea of how reasonable these results are, I consider additional implications of the calibration in terms of other variables of interest. First, the markups implied by the calibration are 17.6%, 6.9%, and 2.8% under monopoly, duopoly and triopoly, respectively. These values seem a priori reasonable. The frequency ratio between one-store markets and two-store markets is .256 under the uniform distribution and 5.54 under the Pareto distribution (the latter was directly calibrated from the city location data). Based on the results from the FTC study that were made public, one can estimate the same ratio to be about .5 under the FTC market de¯nition (see Dalkir and Warren-Boulton, 1998) . This value lies between the uniform and Pareto distribution values. This, together with the fact that the results do not di®er too much between the uniform and Pareto cases, gives additional con¯dence to the calibration results. Finally, the model implies that it takes a market 5.8 times bigger to support two¯rms than it does to support one; and it takes a market 2.9 times bigger to support three¯rms than to support two. These ratios are much greater than the ones estimated by Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) for selected businesses in small U.S. towns. It is not obvious, however, whether the Bresnahan-Reiss estimates would extend to markets greater than small towns and to businesses with signi¯cantly greater entry costs, like o±ce supplies superstores.
Concluding remarks
I have argued that the possibility of post-merger entry substantially improves the e®ect of a merger on consumer welfare. I have also shown that post-merger entry drastically shifts the perspective on cost e±ciencies as a merger defense and asset sales as a remedy. Cost e±ciencies (in the form of lower marginal cost) decrease the likelihood of entry, and thus bene¯t consumers less than if entry conditions were exogenously given. Likewise, by selling assets (stores) to potential rivals, merging¯rms e®ectively \buy them o®," that is, dissuade them from opening new stores, an e®ect that is detrimental to consumers. Although my results are primarily of a qualitative nature, I have attempted to show, by means of numerical calibration, that the e®ects of entry are non-negligible. I should add, however, that the numerical results are subject to a number of caveats. Commenting on the supermarket industry, it has been argued that Typically, it is fairly di±cult for a newcomer to enter a supermarket market from outside, [as it lacks] the advertising umbrella, supervision, and distribution facilities to make it a potential competitor (Foer, 1999) .
In terms of the model in the previous section, this can be interpreted to imply that the entry cost k is greater for the potential entrant than for the incumbents. One should also add that, while the price increase e®ects of a merger are likely to take place almost immediately after the merger, entry may take longer to materialize. For these reasons, the numerical model provides an upper bound on the probability of entry.
A second important caveat is the model itself. That is, the calibration results are limited by the validity of the circular-city approach to modeling spatial competition. The problem with this model is that it imposes too strong neighborhood e®ects. However, the alternative | the representative agent logit model | may be criticized for the exact opposite reason, viz. not allowing for neighborhood e®ects. The distinction matters, for, as Werden and Froeb's (1998) analysis suggests, the likelihood of post-merger entry is signi¯cantly lower with a logit demand model.
Reality is somewhere between the two extremes of product di®erentiation, and I would expect the results also to lie somewhere in between. At a minimum, my results prove the possibility that post-merger entry changes merger analysis in a substantive way, in particular the analysis of e±ciency gains as a defense and asset sales as a remedy.
The above caveats also point to a promising route for future research: to set out and estimate (or calibrate) a more complex, realistic model of product di®erentiation; and, based on this, to measure consumer welfare in the pre-and post-merger equilibria.
